

Town Meeting



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What Is Our Stake in Europe?

Moderator, JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.

Speakers

THEODORE H. WHITE WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN



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THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

THEODORE H. WHITE—Author of *Fire in the Ashes*; foreign correspondent. Born in Boston, Massachusetts on May 6, 1915, Theodore White graduated from public school at the depth of the depression, and worked for two years to help support his family by selling newspapers. At the end of that period he received a newsboys' scholarship to Harvard, and though he continued for a while to earn money by odd jobs he did well enough in his studies to be elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and to graduate in 1938, summa cum laude, and to be granted a Sheldon Fellowship for a year's travel abroad. Mr. White went to England, France, the Middle East, and last to China, where he free-lanced, then joined the Chinese Nationalistic government in its retreat to the mountains, then became a correspondent for *Time*. He stayed in the Orient until in 1945, he stood on the decks of the Missouri and witnessed the signing of Japan's surrender.

Since the war he has worked in Europe, first as chief European correspondent for the Overseas News Agency, then in the same capacity for *The Reporter*; and intermittently as an article writer for numerous magazines. *Thunder Out of China*, on which he collaborated with Annalee Jacoby, was the fruit of seven years in the Orient; *Fire in the Ashes* comes after five busy years in Europe.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN—Author of *Beyond Containment*; columnist for the *Wall Street Journal*, and other papers. William Chamberlin attended Penn Charter School in Philadelphia and then went on to Haverford College where he graduated with the degree of an Litt. D from Haverford, and an LL. D. from Middlebury, both honorary degrees. Entering the newspaper field, Mr. Chamberlin was a foreign correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in Moscow from 1922-34, Tokyo 1934-39, and in Paris from 1939-40. He has also contributed to several British publications including the *Manchester Guardian*, *The Observer*, *The Economist*, and *The Spectator*. At present, he is Editorial correspondent of *The Wall Street Journal*, and a regular contributor to *The New Leader*, and the book section of *The Chicago Tribune*. His published books include, *Russia's Iron Age*, *Confessions of an Individualist*, and more recently, *Beyond Containment* and *Blueprint For World Conquest*.

Moderator: JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.—New York Attorney, International Counsel and Lecturer.

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What Is Our Stake in Europe?

Moderator Murray:

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight America's Town Meeting celebrates a birthday. This evening we complete our 800th program of uninterrupted forum presentations to the people of America. America's Town Meeting is proud to have reached this milestone of distinction on such a long road of public service which began on May 30, 1935. It is our fervent hope that for many years to come you will continue to receive us each week into your homes and welcome the distinguished spokesmen who meet week after week in traditional debate on the most vital issues of the day as they affect our nation and the world at large.

Tonight we are face to face with just such a vital issue. In less than two weeks, the Big Four foreign ministers will come together in Berlin to seek once more some basis of agreement upon which eventual treaties of peace may be written for Germany and Austria. It has been some five years since the last Big Four meeting took place, and debate has been sharp among the democracies of the world as to whether this conference should be convened at this time or indeed if it should ever be held at all.

Aside from questioning the sincerity of the Soviet Union, many states would argue that astute diplomacy could achieve more for us than the repeated public conferences. Others fear that the agenda is too vague or that perhaps there has been too much haste or that because of some lack of elemental unity we risk becoming victims of Moscow's campaign to divide us from our allies. Whatever the case may be, few will deny that the

United States now approaches the conference table in a somewhat more advantageous position than heretofore, and because of this it behooves us even more to know precisely what is our position and our purpose in Europe and hence the issue of tonight's debate: "What Is Our Stake in Europe?"

To discuss this very important topic, Town Meeting is pleased to present first Mr. William Henry Chamberlin, author of *Beyond Containment* and columnist for the *Wall Street Journal* and other papers. Mr. Chamberlin was graduated from Haverford College with the degree of L. L. D. and from Middlebury. A graduate of Haverford, he then became foreign correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in Moscow, Tokyo and in Paris. His published books include *Russia's Iron Age*, *Confessions of an Individualist* and, more recently, *Beyond Containment*.

Town Meeting is proud to welcome Mr. William Henry Chamberlin.

Mr. Chamberlin:

Because of its human, industrial and technical resources, Western Europe is a vital sector in the cold war which Soviet Imperialism has forced upon the world. The eastern half of Europe has disappeared, not forever, we trust, behind the Iron Curtain. Nine formerly independent nations, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, together with East Germany, have been reduced to provinces in the vast communist empire ruled from Moscow.

This empire is greater than Genghis Kahn's. It includes one-third of the population and one-fifth of the area of the world. Its

very existence poses a constant double threat of military aggression and propaganda subversion to the United States and to every free nation. For elementary reasons of national security, we cannot allow the more advanced industrial nations of Western Europe to go the way of Eastern Europe. And piecemeal aid to separate European countries is not enough. Europe's freedom and safety and ours will be assured only when Western Europe is united in freedom, as Eastern Europe now is unhappily united in servitude to Moscow.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are entirely justified in their urgent appeals for prompt ratification of the European Defense Community treaty which was initialed almost two years ago. This treaty, originally a French suggestion, although France is mainly responsible for delaying ratification, provides for German contingents in a European Army under a European political authority. The importance of quickly implementing this or some alternative scheme is not only that it will fill a gaping hole in European ground defenses. What is at stake is nothing less than the making or unmaking of United Europe.

European Defense Community is the best and perhaps the last chance to bring Germany with its energy and resources under the anti-communist pro-western leadership of that great statesman, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, into a close European political, economic, and military union. All that we have accomplished in helping to put Europe on its feet since the war will be gravely endangered if the nations of Western Europe leave the road to unity, which has been recommended by statesmen-

like European leaders of all nationalities, and go their separate ways, succumbing to fears and suspicions which are obsolete in the face of the great power of darkness and evil in the East.

Should this happen, all the European countries, strong in potential union, but each individually weak, will scarcely be able to resist the pressures and blandishments of Moscow. What Benjamin Franklin said of the 13 American colonies is true today for the nations of Europe that have remained free. They must hang together or they will hang separately. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chamberlin. Our next guest this evening was born in Boston, Massachusetts, and was graduated from public school at the depth of the depression. He received a newsboys' scholarship to Harvard, was elected there to Phi Beta Kappa, graduated in 1938 *summa cum laude* and was granted a Sheldon fellowship for a year's travel-study abroad.

He went to England, France, the Middle East, and at last to China where he free lanced, joined the Chinese Nationalist Government in its retreat to the mountains and then became a correspondent for *Time*. He stayed in the Orient until 1945. Since the war he has worked in Europe, first as chief correspondent for the *Overseas News Agency* and then in the same capacity for the *Reporter*. He has authored, as a co-author with Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China* and more recently his best selling book, *Fire in the Ashes*, after five busy years in Europe.

It is with great pleasure that we welcome Mr. Theodore H. White to America's Town Meeting

Mr. White:

Mr. Murray, I can't believe that anyone in this hall or in our entire unseen audience is in any doubt as to what our stake in Europe is. Our stake in Europe is peace. To be specific, our stake in Europe this evening is six divisions, almost a quarter of a million American boys and men sleeping in their barracks, ready for battle on the first alert. They are there because of those Americans I call "the forgotten six divisions"—those other American boys, equivalent to six divisions, who laid down their lives in two wars in Europe and who sleep under those fields, under their white crosses, mute witnesses to what happens to us whenever Europe blows up.

Our purpose in Europe is, therefore, to see that Europe never blows up again. Over the past three years we have shaped this purpose into a huge diplomatic project called the Union of Europe, an enterprise which we Americans sponsor to bring the West Europeans together in a Union of States with such prosperity and common sovereignty that they will never want, or be able, to make war on each other again, while at the same time they will be able to join us in defense against our common adversary to the east if need be.

What worries me at the moment are our own tactics. I am worried that our own national American impatience may exert such intolerable pressure on the Europeans to consummate their union in the next few months as to make them rebel out of sheer exasperation. I am equally worried by the way many of us think of this European union simply as an army, simply as a gadget to get German troops into uniform again, not realizing that this union was conceived by

the French and sponsored by us to guarantee us against the devious and disturbing qualities of the Germans as well as the no less menacing Russians.

I believe that in the past few years we have won a magnificent series of victories in the world struggle against communism. Among these one of the greatest is our success in aiding European Union as far as it has already gone, but I fear we may cast this victory away almost at the point of fruition by our own impatience at continuing the slow, tedious, necessarily complicated burdens we have thus far so honorably borne.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Mr. White. Gentlemen, before we enter into the heart of our discussion I think it might be well if I could enlist from you your ideas precisely as to what you believe Europe is in terms at least of the way our foreign policy is organized. Do you agree as to what Europe really is? Mr. White.

Mr. White: In the geography book I used at school, Europe is everything this side of the Urals. It included Russia. Today for us it no longer does. Today, Europe is everything somewhere this side of the Iron Curtain. But I will be more specific than that. For me, personally, Europe is everywhere where liberty exists or has existed, liberty as we know it. And the dividing line is somewhere in central Germany, between the towns of Hanover and Brunswick, between the people who cherish freedom and the people who are subject to the alien influences of despotism and contempt of human rights.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Chamberlin, do you agree that Europe ends somewhere in Germany?

Mr. Chamberlin: No, I would extend the boundary of Europe

farther east. I would say that Europe begins where the Soviet influence ends, and I think there is a sharp distinction between the part of Europe that has been under Soviet rule and Soviet influence since 1917 and that part that has been unhappily occupied and exploited and oppressed by the Soviet Union since the Second World War. So I should think that the frontier of Europe is about wherever the proper frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union is.

Mr. Murray: Well, you would exclude the Soviet Union as part and parcel of Western Europe or even Eastern Europe?

Mr. Chamberlin: I think under the present regime, yes. I hope that the day will come when the peoples of the Soviet Union gain freedom also, but I feel that under the present leadership, under the present iron grip that has been fastened on them, one cannot feel that the Soviet Union belongs to Europe. It belongs much more to Asia.

Mr. Murray: Mr. White, do you object to that?

Mr. White: I don't. I just want to clarify this for our participants who are going to take part in our talk. We as Americans have to have policies for every area of the world. One part of Europe, Western Europe, is our ally. We have one policy for them. In between Western Europe, which goes up to Germany and Russia, lies another big chunk of states—a hundred million people. We have another policy for those states under Soviet domination. Then there is a third part of Europe—that is Russia itself—and we have a third policy for that. But the Europe we speak of is three different things—Free Europe, Occupied Europe, and Russia.

Mr. Murray: Tonight since we are attempting to describe what is our stake in Europe, which of the three Europes, gentlemen, are we primarily concerned with in terms of American foreign policy?

Mr. White: Western Europe.

Mr. Murray: Do you agree with that, Mr. Chamberlin?

Mr. Chamberlin: Yes, it is only in Western Europe that we can have a direct influence on the course of events.

Mr. Murray: A second point of considerable importance, I believe, for the American people is the point of orientation and that is the Yalta Conference. In the concept of the average American it was at Yalta that perhaps some of our great European problems really began. Mr. Chamberlin, do you feel that in Yalta we allowed ourselves to give, shall we say, an appeasement approach to the policy of our contact with the Soviet Union in Europe?

Mr. Chamberlin: The answer is unfortunately and unmistakably yes. I feel that Yalta witnessed a complete disarmoring of every idea for which the United States professedly entered the Second World War. There was complete betrayal of the idea of self-determination in the unhistoric, outrageous frontiers that were drawn there for Poland and for Germany; there was the betrayal of the most elementary rights of humanity in the provision of Yalta for German slave labor after the war, and also for the forcible return of Soviet political refugees to certain death or slave labor.

The whole instrument of Yalta was simply, it seems to me, a cynical and hypocritical negation of the Atlantic Charter and four freedoms which were the ideals for

which the more thoughtful Americans and other Western peoples were fighting in the last war.

Mr. Murray: Mr. White, you entirely disagree?

Mr. White: That is the commonly accepted view of Yalta, and if you permit me to say so, Mr. Chamberlin, I think you are wrong. And since that view is so common I was reading Winston Churchill this evening before I came here. He has read this criticism also and he said, and I quote: "It is easy after the Germans are beaten to condemn those who did their best to hearten the Russian military effort. What would have happened if we had quarreled with Russia while Germany still had 200 or 300 divisions on the fighting fronts?"

What everyone forgets is this, even in the desperate war the Germans had six million troops under arms. We were trying to get the Russians to come into the Japanese war; we were just going through Iwo Jima; MacArthur was just landing in Manila; we had no atom bomb at that time. The first estimate of the landing in Kyushu was that it might cost us 75,000 casualties. We were bargaining for the lives of American soldiers; we wanted the Russians to come into that war.

The European features of Yalta were the simplest things in the world. We asked that the Germans pay twenty billion reparations. Think of the 200 billion dollars we had spent in the war that Germany started, think of the damage and suffering she caused.

Mr. Murray: I think Mr. Chamberlin has an answer, either for you or Mr. Churchill.

Mr. Chamberlin: Well I feel that Winston Churchill, a very eloquent writer and a great states-

man, speaks in many voices. I am very sorry that I have not here his latest book, because I think you would find that very shortly after that whitewash apology for Yalta, which is not in the least convincing, that Mr. White quoted, there is a devastating analysis of the fearful threat which the Soviet Union represented immediately after Yalta. Churchill was writing of events that happened only a few weeks after Yalta and he most eloquently and truthfully said: "One President, Roosevelt, could not act and the other, Truman, could not know."

And Churchill has a superb analysis, far more detailed and far more convincing, of the terrific threat that Russia presented. And as Churchill said that even in the moment of victory he had a deep foreboding and a sense of oppression because he saw this new threat that was rising in place of the one that had just been destroyed. I think the whole idea that we had to bribe Stalin to enter the war against Japan has no foundation whatever.

You couldn't have kept Stalin out of that war. And it would have been very much to our interest to make a quick peace with Japan, keep Russia out of Manchuria and out of Korea, and all our troubles in the Far East might not have occurred.

Mr. Murray: I would like to limit the debate this evening to the European theater. And to that end it occurs to me to inquire whether or not you would be in agreement to identify any one nation as the key to the great problems facing us in Europe now, or whether it is as simple as that? Mr. White.

Mr. White: It is not quite as simple as that. There are several

cues. We are building a new structure for peace. The cornerstone for that structure is England. Without England the whole free world falls apart. Upon that structure the next most important nation is France. Unless you know the real estate of France, the geography of France, there's no continental defense possible. Upon France we have to get Germany because you need Germany for any full, expanding, dynamic economy. We need each of those three, but I believe we need them in this priority: England first, France second, Germany third.

Mr. Murray: Are you in accord with that, Mr. Chamberlin?

Mr. Chamberlin: I differ in this one point. I would agree with Mr. White that agreement and substantial alliance with England is absolutely necessary for our own security and still more, perhaps, for the British. I would put Germany ahead of France in my order of priorities, because I believe that Germany is a far stronger and more stable potential ally than France is. France has a communist fifth column of about 25 per cent of the voters. There is no communist fifth column in West Germany. The whole position in Germany politically is much more stable, and certainly much more consistently anti-communist than the position of France.

Therefore I think that I am convinced, even if I am getting a little ahead of our subject here, that it is of vital importance, not only for military reasons but for political reasons, to accept and to get Germany in as an equal partner in the Western community on a common anti-communist front.

Mr. Murray: Perhaps we could consider them in order. Mr. White,

I know you had in mind to make some objection.

Mr. White: No, I was just trying to smoke a cigarette.

Mr. Murray: Oh, I see. Perhaps we could consider the countries in order, and I know that it is on the minds of the people of the United States—what must we do to accommodate France? How can we handle the French aspect of this problem which you, Mr. White, feel is in a certain priority among the three great nations?

Mr. Chamberlin: My idea would be simply to use all the diplomatic pressure that is possible to bring about in France speedy action on this EDC treaty which was initiated almost two years ago, to be exact in May of 1952. I would rather have a negative decision in France than have this simply killed by prolonged inaction, because a negative decision would mean that then it would be up to the French either to propose a feasible alternative or for us, and I hope the British also, to go ahead and make our own arrangements with Germany.

Mr. Murray: Mr. White?

Mr. White: In your whole thesis Mr. Chamberlin, the thing I think you overlook is the fact that we have fought two wars against the Germans in this century. They have cost us more grief, more casualties, and more taxes than anything else that ever happened to us, but the French have been on our side during these two wars. I believe that it is vitally important to have the Germans on our side against the Russians. I am extremely interested in the terms and conditions under which we get the Germans into partnership.

I am not willing to have them in partnership with us in any association in which they would create

the whip. The only thing possible is the EDC for that, and we both know you need France. You aren't going to bludgeon France into the EDC by giving her ultimatums, by saying you do this or else. She has already ratified the Schuman Plan, put it into operation, and she is moving, I believe, as fast as French politics will permit.

Mr. Murray: Well, aren't we faced with a time element here, gentlemen?

Mr. Chamberlin: I think that we are. I think that the length of time that has been taken in the rearming of Germany and the acceptance of Germany is beyond all bounds because the principle was accepted three years ago. Then there were long time-wasting debates, and so on. Now the time is really favorable from the standpoint of Germany, because Chancellor Adenauer, I think, can't be sufficiently praised for his political courage in disregarding a very unfavorable Italian election. He went to the German people forthrightly for the integration of Western Europe, for the European Army, for the submergence of German sovereignty in a common European authority.

Now if we allow the French simply to sabotage and block, this position indefinitely, there is grave danger, I think, that Adenauer's prestige will fall, and that Germany will lapse into an attitude of sullen neutralism at best and maybe into the idea of trying to make terms with the Soviet Union. I haven't the slightest fear of what Germany will do if once it is accepted as a partner with the rest.

I think it is quite absurd to think of Germany in terms of the Kaiser or of Hitler, because Germany today, a German army, would be completely dependent on

America for many of its vital modern weapons. Germany even under the maximum EDC program is supposed to have 12 divisions against the Soviet 175. I cannot see that Germany is in any position to crack the whip. I think that Germany is a necessary asset, a very important asset, but I think the wiser Germans themselves under the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer realize that Germany can no longer be an independent great power, and that Germany's real future lies with equal association with the West.

Mr. Murray: What is your analysis of that situation, Mr. White?

Mr. White: It goes about like this: It took us Americans seven years to make the Constitution of the U. S. of America from the Articles of Confederation after the Revolutionary War. We spoke the same language; we had fought together on the same terms; it took us seven years to make our Constitution. We announce to the Europeans, after a thousand years of hatred, to make a constitution and a union within three years and we say, do it by this spring or else. And I am irritated as I can be by the French attitude, for I have just come from there, I understand it.

It is like this, Mr. Chamberlin. Both of us are walking down Fifth Avenue and I punched you in the nose and drew blood and a policeman came along and said, "There, there, boys now kiss and make up, shake hands and be good fellows." It would be a lot easier for me the aggressor to shake hands with you than for you the fellow who had been hit to shake hands with me. The Germans beat the stuffing out of the French just a few years ago. What we are giving

in this deal is full equality with them and forgiveness for all their past damages. The French are hesitating on this. I think they are going to pass it. I think they won't pass it if we tell them to do it or, "we will cut you adrift."

Mr. Chamberlin: I think those are oversimplifications there. For one thing a mere consideration of Franco-German relations without considering Louis XIV and Napoleon—many times when the French did some rather unpleasant things to the Germans—would be not quite objective. And also the fact that the French got quite a little revenge in the occupation of Germany and in their attempt now to detach The Saar, which is an integral part of Germany, from Germany.

I think Mr. White overlooked the essential fact that we, fortunately, at the time of making our union, had no Soviet Union breathing down our necks, and Europe just hasn't got that much time. It might be better if there were that time, but as things stand today there is an element of urgency which very fortunately didn't exist for us in the time of forming our federal union.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, what is the alternative to the EDC with respect to Germany and France and Europe as a whole? Mr. White?

Mr. White: It is because I don't believe there is any alternative to EDC, that I am unwilling to force it to the breaking point right now. I believe there are tactical ways of getting this European army and European defense thing through. There's another project also signed, also directed by these six nations. The French insist the other project come first. They say that when this European Army and European eco-

nomic system is created that there be a real European Congress of Senators and Congressmen elected by all the people of Europe who will meet together as a Congress of Europe, and that this Congress, elected by the people, shall have control of the Army and the economics of this new state that is being built. Now I, for example, would like to see that EPC thing, the political community, the Congress of Europe, passed first.

Mr. Murray: I am sorry, Mr. Chamberlin is about to object.

Mr. Chamberlin: I object on this ground that Mr. White is giving the impression that it is the French who are eagerly pressing forward the European Political Community. Actually the Germans have been willing to go much further than that. It is the French who have been holding back on the European Political Community just as stubbornly as on the army. So I would rise there to a point of objection. I think it is the Germans and Dutch who are willing to go further than anybody else in submerging sovereignty, and there is a great deal of French opposition to EDC on this part of losing sovereignty.

I would agree with Mr. White that EDC is the best available means of incorporating Germany in the West without arousing fears and suspicions, that I think are totally groundless in the present world distribution of forces. At any rate, I would go along with EDC. However, if that fails (I am not willing to see it delayed in the field by sabotage and inaction), if that is voted down, then I would favor either a very strong insistence that Germany must be taken into NATO as an equal partner, or if that fails, then a straight Anglo-American-German Alliance.

Mr. White: Well, in that way you are perfectly willing to give France to the Russians and to break France off completely from us.

Mr. Murray: On that very point, Mr. White, what are we to do in terms of our policy if we *must* go ahead without France or face interminable delay?

Mr. White: I believe, and that is what I said in the opening statement, that we have a national habit of impatience. We are going ahead, we are going ahead all the time. The counsel I have to give is that we keep on as we have been going. The French have no way now to wriggle off this hook unless we force them off the hook, unless we say: "America tells you to do it." They sponsored it; it was their idea; it is in their parliament, they can't not pass it. That would mean national bankruptcy.

Mr. Murray: As many of you know, ladies and gentlemen, each week Town Meeting presents a handsome twenty-volume set of the American People's Encyclopedia to a listener who submits the most provocative and timely question pertinent to the subject under discussion. Tonight's question comes from Mrs. Robert McIntosh of Ames, Iowa. Mrs. McIntosh's question is: "Have we capitalized on errors made by the Russians in Europe?" Mr. White.

Mr. White: Well, I would say it would be difficult not to. I disagree with most Americans. I think that Stalin was one of the most bungling, stupid diplomats the world has ever seen. He thrust things into our hands which it was difficult for us not to grasp. He drove France away from him when the French would have loved to associate with the Russians. We picked up the chips. He brutalized

Eastern Germany so terribly that even all Western Germans for the time being are good democrats. I think we could have done more with the opportunities given us, but I certainly think we did fairly well in Europe.

Mr. Murray: What's your opinion on that, Mr. Chamberlin?

Mr. Chamberlin: I would say we capitalized somewhat but not enough. I think that our inability to capitalize enough is due to the slowness with which we realized the necessity and desirability of integrating Germany on equal terms with Western Europe, and also on our failure to get an armed German force. I believe that if there had been a few German divisions along the German border, that the uprising of June 17, which, as it developed, was just a heroic demonstration, might have developed into something completely beyond the political control of the Russians and might then have spread as a chain reaction to all the satellite states.

That is why I am so eager to see West Germany get a military strength, and a position of equality in the Western World, because I think that will make the Soviet political position in East Germany simply untenable. The minute the Soviets are forced out of East Germany, then it won't be long before Poland and Czechoslovakia and the other satellite countries go the same way.

Mr. Murray: Did you wish to comment on that, Mr. White?

Mr. White: Yes, I did very briefly. Mr. Chamberlin, I think you put far too much emphasis on force. A couple of German divisions on that border that tried to march into East Germany when the Red army was there would have kicked off a World war. In this

day and age force is not limited; force is total. The blunder I think we made was that we didn't get down deep enough to the roots of poverty and hunger in Western Europe. I think we never cleaned out the communist party in Italy or France where they should have been cleaned out, by building good houses, giving them decent jobs, decent wages at the time it was within America's power to see that that was done.

Mr. Murray: Do you have any further comment on that, Mr. Chamberlin?

Mr. Chamberlin: Only that I think everybody is for good houses and decent working conditions for their own sake as well as a means of combating communism. I am really less optimistic than I think Mr. White is in his generally excellent book, because I don't believe that America can make over the social, economic systems of

France and Italy very much from outside.

Mr. Murray: Mr. White?

Mr. White: I think there was a time when we could have had tremendous influence. We gave too much, gratis, to France. It was given for industrial recovery. The French industrial system is tied up in cartels, in trust and trade agreements which are terrible. Too much of the money we gave to France, not all of it, but too much of it went to these trusts and these cartels, giving France this non-competitive, non-modern industrial system. We ought to have insisted that whatever industrial equipment we give France be earmarked for corporations that trade as American corporations do, in terms of high efficiency, in terms of high competition, and not in terms of dividing up markets and keeping down wages. We should have put tags on it.

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QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Murray: Ladies and gentlemen, now we come to the question period of America's Town Meeting where we entertain questions from members of the audience directed to our two distinguished panelists, and I will take a question from the gentleman on my right, please.

Questioner: My question is directed to Mr. Chamberlin. Don't you think that neutralism is more appealing to the Germans than the communist claim that they will be cannon fodder for the U.S.A., especially since they were our former enemies during the Second World War?

Mr. Chamberlin: I think the answer to that was given on September 6. There was a German

free election in West Germany, where all parties including the German Communist party had a right to take part in the election campaign and their votes were honestly counted. It was a completely free, honest election, and the result of that election was that the communists got so few votes that they hadn't a single member in the German Bundestag. There were parties also that steered toward neutralism—"a plague on both your houses." When I was in Germany last summer I saw some of the posters, some of the agitation. They were making the utmost out of discontent with American troops in Germany and so on. They go absolutely nowhere.

Considering the European tradition, for which German past has not been exempt, of multiple parties and weak cabinets, I think the vote of confidence in Chancellor Adenauer is something very impressive. Certainly I would be sure that the majority of German people today are firmly committed to a Western orientation, and are convinced that there is no possibility of neutralism, and that nothing but utter disaster would come from the whole of Germany suffering what East Germany is suffering under the Russians.

Mr. Murray: The lady on my left.

Questioner: My question is for Mr. White. Isn't our continuing leadership in the struggle for the minds and hearts of men dependent largely upon unifying the voice with which we speak to the world?

Mr. White: I can answer that badly, *yes* and *no*. Our leadership depends more upon our spirit and and upon our mind than upon our force. I would like to see many of the ugly voices in America stilled, and I would like, for example, to hear a speech from the State Department, from President Eisenhower. I even thought President Truman and Dean Acheson were fine people, but I don't want any such hushing or unity of voices in America as to come to a suppression of free speech or suppression of the right to dispute.

Mr. Murray: Next question.

Questioner: Mr. Chamberlin, why is it that our statesmen, who control the destinies of our foreign policies, cannot benefit from the historical fact that we here have had great difficulty in unifying our practically homogeneous population into what is now the U.S.A.? Should we not use, therefore,

patience, time, and sincere friendliness instead of bullying tactics?

Mr. Chamberlin: Well, it seems to me that we are not using bullying tactics; we are merely stating the hard realities of the situation. But we cannot allow a state of military inferiority, which exists today, where American and British troops are carrying the greatest part of the burden of defending this whole continent of Europe, to go on indefinitely.

It is a big mistake to think that the Soviet Union is slacking off or standing idly by. They are building up the satellite state armies and they are building up their own forces, not in numbers perhaps, because they've always had a very complete system of military mobilization, but they are certainly not lagging in the most modern weapons, including atomic weapons.

One of the biggest assets on our side, Germany, is simply left completely disarmed and completely open to possible attack, and it seems to me that the length of time has elapsed—it is not as if we had given the French a series of brief ultimatums immediately after the proposal was made.

What is happening is that the French made a proposal of their own; the treaty was initialed; almost two years have passed, and the French are still unable to make up their minds. I think under those conditions we have every right, in the interest of Europe, quite as much as in our own interest, to insist that some clear, final, definite decision be taken, so that we know where we stand.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Chamberlin. The lady on my left.

Questioner: I wonder does fascism in Germany present a threat

to Western unity comparable to communism in France?

Mr. White: Yes it does. It is not as easy to see as communism in France, because the fear of fascism is not from votes in a party; it is a fear that goes on quietly in the hearts of the Germans who remember other times. I think, though, that the bogey of German fascism is what most causes the French to hesitate when they are summoned to make a union with the Germans.

Mr. Murray: We have time for one more question. The lady in the center, please.

Questioner: Mr. White, unless France and Germany can agree, is it possible that a war between France and Germany might break out eventually and expand into another world war?

Mr. White: I don't think that there is much likelihood of that in the next five or ten years. And that's as far ahead as I can see.

Mr. Murray: Another question, the gentleman on my right.

Questioner: Mr. Chamberlin, as the cold war has lasted a long time, would it not be better for the West to build a solid foundation for long-term security with some co-operative friends, instead of a contrary full show of strength, which has nothing behind it, and may not last as long as we need it?

Mr. Chamberlin: I am in favor of treating as friends those countries that are going our way. I believe allies *are* as allies *do*, and we should judge every country not by its attitude in the last war but by where it stands in relation to communism today.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, gentlemen, and I regret that we must interrupt because our time has expired. Our appreciation for your most interesting discussion.

FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

Background Questions

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. How strong and cohesive is our Atlantic alliance today?
2. What factors have most contributed to its existing strength to date?
 - a. Can all positive accomplishment be realistically attributed to U.S. pressure and aid?
 - b. Has the belligerent posture of the Soviet Union been the strongest force in fostering Western European unity and defense?
 - c. To what extent are our European allies motivated by a belief in themselves, their capacity to remain free and their future in a free world?
3. What are the major factors hampering effective Western European participation in an Atlantic alliance?
 - a. Are neutralist sentiments increasing or decreasing?
 - b. Are old sectionalisms, jealousies and national rivalries re-emerging?
 - c. How does internal political and economic instability affect the actions of our allies? Has the opposition of extreme left and right political factions made decisive action more difficult?
 - d. Has distrust of American motives and fear that we are politically immature and erratic made U.S. leadership less effective?
 - e. Has recent relaxation of overt Russian hostility in Europe contributed to a decline in the feeling of urgency about defense?

WESTERN EUROPE

1. What are the prospects for increased economic co-operation in Western Europe today?
 - a. Has the Schuman Plan started a trend toward economic integration?
 - b. Should the U.S. have an over-all economic policy toward Western Europe so as not to aggravate existing economic rivalries and tensions?
 - c. Can we repeatedly urge our Western allies to trade more among themselves, if we do not favor free trade across the Atlantic?
2. What are prospects for closer political ties among Western European nations? Is political union possible within the foreseeable future?
3. What is the current state of European rearmament? Have European defense efforts been lagging? If so, why?
 - a. Has the military strength of Western Europe increased relative to that of the Soviet Union within the past few years?
 - b. Can NATO countries afford to maintain armaments on the scale now projected?

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

1. Was the American proposal to rearm Germany premature? Did it dampen enthusiasm for other European co-operative efforts?
2. Is the prospect of reconstituting a German military force, even within an all European army, unacceptable to the rest of the European community?

3. Does the phenomenal success of Germany's economic recovery make her neighbors fear her dominance in any such arrangements?
4. What are the major problems facing France in assuming her position in European Defense Community?
 - a. Is fear of German hegemony the paramount factor? Is this why France insists that settlement of the Saar question precede ratification of the treaty?
 - b. How do French Asian commitments affect NATO achievements and the prospects for ratification of the EDC treaty?
 - c. Does French ratification of the treaty depend upon the amount of U.S. military aid forthcoming?
5. How does Britain's aloofness regarding participation in continental affairs affect the future of European defense plans?
 - a. Can any European defense plan succeed without close and active British participation?
 - b. Should France consent to active German participation if the British continental forces are withdrawn?
6. What are the alternatives to the European Defense Community treaty in case it is politically unacceptable or technically impossible?

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY—REAPPRAISAL

1. What did Secretary Dulles mean when he said France's refusal to ratify the EDC treaty would force the U.S. to conduct "agonizing reappraisal of its own basic policies"?
 - a. Did he mean to suggest that we would abandon Europe to the Soviet Union?
 - b. Was he saying that we would have to find alternative to EDC—e.g., rearming Germany independently?
 - c. What of the rumors that the U.S. is contemplating a peripheral strategy, one based upon defending Europe from bases in Britain, North Africa, Spain, etc.? What effect would such a strategy have on Europe? Would we be repudiating the NATO alliance?
 - d. Is there any possibility of the U.S. retiring to hemispheric isolationism, relying on an air-borne retaliatory striking power?
 - e. Was Secretary Dulles attempting to frighten France into EDC ratification? If so, what are the chances that his bluff will be called?
2. Is EDC or French-German rapprochement the real goal?
3. Isn't a reappraisal of American policy necessary in any event—based on development of new weapons, NATO progress, current estimates of Soviet power and purpose, etc?
4. Should the U.S. confine its aid to the military? Or, should large-scale economic aid be resumed?
5. Evaluate President Eisenhower's proposal for an atomic pool for peaceful purposes. How was this proposal received abroad?
6. Evaluate the prospective Big Four talks.
 - a. Should the U.S. operate on the assumption that the Soviet "peace offensive" is only a tactical move? If so, how can we best capitalize on the present Soviet attitude?
 - b. Should the West be prepared to push strongly for German reunification? If so, should it be willing to pay the price of German neutralization?